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ABSTRACT
Despite adequate warning, an existing operational structure, and the 
presence of experienced non-governmental relief agencies (NGOs), a major 
disaster occurred when refugees fleeing from northern Ethiopia entered 
Sudan in late 1984 and early 1985. A review of the history of the early 
stages of that operation indicates that the problems were primarily poli­
tical, managerial and organizational. This paper examines those problems, 
describes some of the changes that have taken place in the international 
relief system since that emergency, and suggests some further activities 
to reduce the number and scope of similar problems in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
In early 1984, there were clear signs that a major famine was develop­
ing in northern Ethiopia in the provinces of Tigray and Eritrea. As early 
as 1983, relief organizations working in those areas had reported major 
shortfalls in food production, and the FAO made an appeal for emergency 
food aid at the end of 1983 and again in the spring of 1984.
Despite the continuing civil war in northern Ethiopia, there was con­
siderable information from inside the rebel-held areas about the magnitude 
of the situation. Cross-border food supply operations had been in exis­
tence for a number of years, and numerous people from both NGOs and the 
press frequently went in and out. The rebel groups in both provinces had 
highly-effective civil relief organizations, supported by recognized and 
well-respected international NGOs. All these organizations reported that 
the combination of war and famine was placing considerable strain on food 
production systems and that people were unable to cope with mounting food 
shortages. Migration of people to government-held garrison towns was 
increasing at an alarming rate. One of the organizations, the Relief 
Society of Tigray (REST), notified relief authorities in Sudan that, if 
the amount of food supplies crossing the border could not be increased, it 
would be necessary to send a portion of the population westward into 
Sudan.
In Sudan, the UNHCR was supporting the largest refugee assistance and 
maintenance program in Africa. The UNHCR Branch Office in Sudan was the 
largest of their branch offices and was headed by the former chief of the
UNHCR Emergency Unit. In the eastern region where the refugees were 
destined to arrive, the UNHCR maintained a Sub-Office and supported the 
Sudanese government with a series of field officers stationed at the 
principal refugee settlements in the region.
The office of the Commissioner of Refugees (COR) was the Sudanese 
government agency responsible for receiving and assisting refugees. Its’ 
biggest program area was in the eastern region where a project manager 
with a rank equal to that of the Commissioner was headquartered in 
Showak. The project manager had real operational authority. He was 
supported by a major logistics base in Showak and satellite facilities in 
Gedaref, Doka and Kassala. Prior to the crisis, the COR had been assis­
ting Eritreans, Tigrayans and other Ethiopian refugees in over two dozen 
different settlements scattered throughout the eastern region. A compre­
hensive program of food, work, education and resettlement had long been 
established and was operating fairly smoothly for the 130,000 refugees 
then in Sudan.
Logistically, the influx could not have occurred in a better loca­
tion. The most important paved highway in Sudan, connecting Port Sudan 
with Khartoum, runs roughly parallel to the Ethiopian border from Kassala 
to Gedaref. The Port Sudan-Kassala railway runs adjacent to the highway 
from Kassala to Gedaref, then south towards Doka before turning eastward 
to Khartoum. There is a major paved airport capable of handling large 
jets at Kassala, and at Gedaref a gravel strip capable of handling C-130s 
is available. The desert throughout the area is hard and flat, enabling 
both vehicles and airplanes to go almost anywhere.
Water resources are among the best in all of Sudan. Surface water is 
available half the year in the Atbara River. There is a major reservoir 
at Kashim el-Girba and, even when not flowing, the Atbara and Setit rivers 
form major pools of water which can support large populations.
Despite consistent early warnings, extensive on-site organizational 
capacity and tremendous logistical assets, a major disaster began to 
develop in the eastern region. In September 1984, the first large influx 
of Tigrayans began; by November, a full-fledged migration was underway.
By December, measles had been reported in two of the new refugee settle­
ments and, by January, death rates in all the camps accepting new arrivals 
had reached levels in excess of 15 per 10,000 per day. It was not until 
late March that the death rates finally began to come down and the situa­
tion became more manageable.
It is clear that there were many failures at all levels of the relief 
system, but what were the key problems and issues that prevented a rapid 
response? In retrospect, it appears that three sets of constraints 
hindered operations: political, managerial and organizational.
II. POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
It would not be fair to the persons in charge in Sudan not to clearly 
identify the major constraints to an early response and explain the envir­
onment within which decisions had to be made in mid-1984.
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The first and by far the most important political constraint concerned 
the Falashas. By 1984, the number of Ethiopian Jews entering Sudan had 
become large enough to attract the attention of the international Jewish 
community and an international effort was underway to smuggle the Falashas 
from Sudan to Israel. This effort, organized and supported from Khartoum 
by the U.S. Embassy, involved payoffs to high Sudanese government offi­
cials and was carried out under not only a cloak of secrecy but also a 
major campaign of disinformation. Targets of the disinformation campaign 
included the UNHCR Branch Office and staff of the Sudanese Commissioner of 
Refugees. By mid-1984, this disinformation campaign had degenerated into 
a personal conflict between the resident refugee programs officer in the 
U.S. Embassy and the head of the UNHCR Branch Office. The details of this 
situation are not worth repeating; suffice it to say that, by the time the 
emergency began to develop, no one in UNHCR believed anything the American 
Embassy said about refugees; therefore, when accurate warnings were trans­
mitted to UNHCR, no one in the Branch Office or in COR gave them much 
credence. The point of mentioning this situation is not to criticize 
either party, but to point out that such political and personal factors 
often become dominant constraints in an emergency and must be taken into 
account in every analysis.
A second political constraint was the reluctance of the Sudanese 
government to accept any more refugees. The Sudanese pointed out that 
their policy of asylum had led to their country hosting the largest refu­
gee population in Africa (almost 700,000). Despite numerous pledges from 
the international community to assist with this burden, aid had been (and 
still is) far short of that required and the Sudanese, who already had a 
battered economy, were not anxious to increase their economic burden.
While most refugee officials recognized that the refugees, in many cases, 
made a contribution to the Sudanese economy —  especially those who worked 
in the agricultural schemes in the east —  some government officials used 
the refugee situation as a scapegoat for the country’s economic woes.
Given the increasingly anti-refugee rhetoric, UNHCR was reluctant to 
discuss possible influxes of large numbers of new refugees, and the COR 
was reluctant to take steps to stockpile emergency supplies that might 
draw attention to the situation and cause a political backlash, making it 
more difficult for the agency to operate its existing programs.
A third political factor that played a major part in the failure to 
prepare for the operation, and served to constantly constrain food relief 
operations, was the developing famine in other parts of Sudan. In the 
regions of Darfur and Khordufan, the continuing African drought resulted 
in massive crop failures for almost fifteen percent of the country’s popu­
lation. In the south, the continuing, expanding civil war was displacing 
large numbers of people and disrupting agriculture in that area. By mid- 
1985, it was obvious that major shortfalls would occur in the production 
and supply of basic grains and that massive tonnages of sorghum and wheat 
would be required to stave off a famine in the western and central parts 
of the country. Thus, even though some food reserves were available in 
Gedaref, UNHCR and COR were notified that these foods were unavailable for 
the refugees and that any food required to meet emergency needs would have 
to be imported.
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III. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS
It would be an understatement to say that the organizations that 
provided the initial response to the emergency were unprepared organiza­
tionally for the task. There were several major factors that slowed and 
reduced the effectiveness of their response.
First, all of the agencies were organized and structured for long­
term, routine support of the existing refugee population and not for an 
emergency operation. In addition to the usual vague titles of "program 
officer", "field officer", etc., UNHCR and COR staff consisted primarily 
of education, resettlement, income-generation and agriculture officers.
No one within the organizations was tasked with preparedness, monitoring 
the situation in Ethiopia, or developing operational capabilities for an 
emergency response. At the same time, there were few who had had actual 
emergency experience, and those who were more operationally-oriented were 
stationed in other regions (primarily in Juba in the south). When the 
emergency occurred, UNHCR was so unprepared in terms of personnel with 
operational experience that it had to rely on consultants for key services 
in logistics, nutrition and public health.
The NGOs had a number of experienced emergency relief personnel. Some 
had had experience in Somalia but most had worked in the Far East, mainly 
with refugees from Kampuchea or boat people from Vietnam. While this 
experience was undoubtedly valuable, it was not completely analogous to 
the developing emergency in Sudan.
The organization with the most clout —  UNHCR —  had severe structural 
constraints that inhibited it from playing a more effective role, espe­
cially in coordination. At the time, UNHCR had a highly-centralized 
organizational structure, and its Representative did not have the leeway 
or operating authority that many have today. The Representative then held 
the rank of P5 (today the same post is slotted for a D1). All major 
decisions had to be made or cleared by Geneva. Thus, when key operational 
matters had to be dealt with, or when it was necessary to commit funds, 
long delays were often incurred while Geneva deliberated.
The delays had a major impact on the entire relief operation. Almost 
all of the COR budget and a substantial portion of the NGOs’ operational 
funds were provided by UNHCR. It has often been said that the main con­
straint to emergency operations is the normal funding cycle of relief 
agencies; Sudan was no exception. Since few of the NGOs in the field had 
sufficient cash reserves to mount an immediate emergency response, they 
had to turn to UNHCR (or to various donor governments) in order to obtain 
the funds. The delays were interminable.
At the field level, there were also a number of structural and organi­
zational problems that delayed the initial response. For reasons that are 
still not entirely clear, UNHCR sited their Sub-Office in Gedaref, while 
the Project Manager for COR was located forty miles away in Showak. As a 
result, the two organizations were often completely out of synch and day- 
to-day emergencies could not be dealt with in a timely and effective
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manner. Radio communications between the two offices were not established 
until the end of January 1985 and, even then, a midday radio wave "skip” 
meant that communications were only effectively available for two hours in 
the morning and two in the afternoon. It was not until May that UNHCR 
finally moved its Sub-Office to Showak.
The NGOs also kept their eastern representatives in Gedaref (and a few 
in Kassala). While on an operational level it was not as important for 
the NGOs to be in Showak (since most of them coordinated their operations 
directly with the camp managers where their programs were located), at the 
policy level they were often excluded from important deliberations. Thus, 
it was difficult to coordinate preparedness activities and, later, emer­
gency operations with the NGOs.
Throughout the emergency, the NGOs consistently failed to understand 
their own limitations and the comprehensiveness of the refugees’ needs. 
Nowhere was this lack of understanding of the complexities involved more 
evident than in the competition between NGOs for prominence in the various 
camps. Many NGOs demanded (and some were granted) permission to "operate" 
a refugee camp entirely by themselves. Most of these agencies were 
totally unprepared to undertake such a mission. Most were medical 
agencies and were unprepared for anything beyond provision of medical 
assistance. The operation of a refugee camp is much like the management 
of a small city. People require not only food and medical attention, but 
also water, sanitation, housing and shelter, garbage collection and dozens 
of other services on a daily basis. Of the thirty-plus relief organiza­
tions, only three included qualified engineers, only one had an architect, 
only three had environmental sanitation specialists, and only one had 
qualified water specialists. With this complement of technicians, the 
relief agencies proposed to meet the needs of a population the size of 
Geneva!
IV. MANAGERIAL CONSTRAINTS
Once the influx started, the emergency quickly began to get out of 
hand. The failure to make early decisions regarding food and logistics 
arrangements was compounded by improper responses by the NGOs and the 
COR. At the very beginning, emphasis was placed on medical response —  
especially curative medicine and therapeutic feeding —  instead of 
ensuring that people had adequate amounts of food and that the vulnerable 
groups were targeted for supplementary feeding. The one health interven­
tion that could have made a major difference, immunization, was almost 
totally ignored. It was not until after measles had already broken out 
(in December) that the organizations began to consider mounting a major 
immunization effort. By that time it was too late.
Throughout the initial stages, the assisting agencies failed to 
address the interrelated problems of water and sanitation. While the NGOs 
were frantically trying to cure diarrhea and treat a host of waterborne 
and related diseases, no serious efforts were made to provide clean 
drinking water until mid-February of 1985, almost five months after the 
emergency began. Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT) was not initiated on a
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massive scale until March, and a sanitation program with adequate latrines 
was never started. Failure to address problems in the water-sanitation- 
hygiene "loop" was the primary cause of death long after the supply of 
food rations became stable, and this prevented the relief agencies from 
bringing the death rate down below the five per 10,000 per day level until 
almost ten months after the emergency began.
In retrospect, failure to manage the emergency effectively can be 
attributed to two major shortcomings:
1. lack of an established emergency relief doctrine. Disaster prepared­
ness begins with a doctrine. An organization must understand what is 
required and what will save lives in order to begin the process of 
preparing for an emergency. Few organizations were prepared in Sudan 
to provide a balanced package of assistance. Most focused on one or 
two approaches and ignored the fact that these approaches would be 
unsuccessful unless other major actions were taken. It did little 
good to provide supplementary feeding if the bulk ration was insuffi­
cient. It did little good to provide curative hospital care if people 
were malnourished initially. And it did little good to provide oral 
rehydration therapy if the refugees only had contaminated water to 
drink.
2. lack of operational preparedness. Few of the organizations, from the 
UN to the NGOs, were adequately prepared to meet the emergency. A few 
agencies had developed emergency manuals. Some had stockpiles of 
medicines and emergency kits. Several had developed and codified 
emergency feeding procedures. The contributions that these prepared­
ness efforts made must be acknowledged but, overall, the organizations 
were generally unprepared for the magnitude of the disaster they 
encountered. Decision-making authority was often vested at the head­
quarters level in another country. Few organizations had adequate 
communications equipment. Few had trained their staff to prepare for 
the emergency conditions that they encountered and, logistically, few 
of the agencies were prepared for the remote and difficult circum­
stances with which their staff were forced to cope. The UNHCR Field 
Officer at Wad Kowli received so little assistance from UNHCR that he 
was forced to borrow food from the NGOs he was supposed to be coordin­
ating !
The lack of preparedness did not end with the onset of the emergency. 
So little attention was given to preparing for contingencies that 
constant "emergencies within the emergency" occurred. Common in 
several refugee camps were fires that could have been prevented, or at 
least controlled, by devoting adequate attention to building fire 
breaks into the camps’ layouts. Major losses of equipment and 
supplies occurred when agencies built structures and facilities from 
local materials without paying attention to warnings of impending rain 
and high wind. In one camp, the first rainstorm drained the surface 
of the camp’s defecation field into the hospital and food storage area 
(this occurred at the height of a cholera outbreak!).
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To some extent, the agencies can be forgiven the lack of planning to 
meet unforeseen needs while trying to combat daily crises. But it is 
clear that a mind-set that militated against preparedness had been esta­
blished from the very beginning of the relief operation. It is no wonder 
then that problems continued to surface and compound.
V. CHANGES PRECIPITATED BY THE SUDAN EMERGENCY
As a direct result of the Sudan emergency (and also of relief opera­
tions in neighboring Ethiopia), a number of changes have occurred in the 
international relief system. Among the more noteworthy are those within 
UNHCR. These include:
1. training initiatives. The Emergency Management Training Programme 
(EMTP), initiated by the UNHCR Emergency Unit and now operated by the 
Training Section, has broadened that organization’s understanding of 
emergencies and resulted in many improvements in UNHCR’s performance 
throughout the world. The program, designed and conducted in conjunc­
tion with the University of Wisconsin Disaster Management Center, is 
the most comprehensive training and professional development program 
ever undertaken by a relief organization. Each year training is 
carried out at all levels of the organization and includes specialized 
4_week courses at the University of Wisconsin, orientation seminars in 
Geneva, and workshops in the principal regions where UNHCR operates.
In addition, specialized workshops are carried out tailored to meet 
the needs of a particular country as an emergency develops. To date, 
more than 400 people from UNHCR, local government organizations and 
NGOs have participated in these training sessions and over 30 new 
publications specific to refugee operations have been prepared.
2. expansion of the Technical Support Section (TSS). It was recognized 
that UNHCR had to play a major role in providing technical support to 
operating partners and implementing agencies. Therefore, a major 
expansion of the Technical Support Section of UNHCR was begun in 1986.
3. structural changes. No other issue played as crucial a role in the 
change of leadership at UNHCR and subsequent restructuring of the 
organization as the Sudan emergency. When he took office, the new 
High Commissioner, prodded by several major donors, initiated several 
changes which should go a long way towards improving UNHCR s emergency 
response. Perhaps the most important of these was a decision to 
assign senior level staff to the countries where mass emergencies are 
most likely to occur.
VI. NEXT STEPS
As positive as these developments have been, much still remains to be 
done. Thorough case studies and evaluations are needed to pinpoint sec­
tors with consistent problems to which new approaches or techniques may be 
applied. All assisting agencies need to develop, with their field staff, 
both preparedness plans and forward planning procedures. And much more
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o attention must be given to developing more effective coordination among agencies and between, agencies and host governments at all levels.
Yet the single most important step is development and promotion of an 
emergency response doctrine. This doctrine would define and promote a 
comprehensive and integrated approach to emergency management in the ini­
tial stages of a developing emergency. The initial steps of responding to 
an emergency can be likened to the opening moves of a chess game. They 
are dictated as much by what we don’t know about the situation as by what 
we know we can expect. In a chess game, no matter what the players’ 
eventual strategy, pawns must be moved in order to create openings and 
flexibility of movement for the capital pieces. Likewise, in an emer­
gency, certain moves must be made and certain systems must be established 
before other options can be brought into play.
In an emergency, lives cannot be saved unless certain interrelated 
sets of activities are immediately established. Diseases cannot be 
controlled, for example, unless there is adequate food supply for the 
affected population. Food will have little bearing unless the people are 
free from diarrhea. Diarrhea cannot be prevented unless there is an 
adequate supply of clean water. Clean water depends on adequate sanita­
tion and good hygiene practice. The various sets and interrelationships 
among and within the sets are depicted in the following figure. Until 
these inter-relationships are clearly understood, responses are esta­
blished according to set doctrines and elaborated into standard operating 
procedures and coordinated training, the overall response to mass emer­
gencies will continue to remain haphazard and refugee mortality will 
remain at high and unacceptable levels.
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